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DUE PROCESS v. DEFENSE COUNSEL'S





During the course of his murder trial' Roger Dale Smith was pre-
vented from addressing the jury which eventually recommended that
he be sentenced to death. Although Smith repeatedly informed his
counsel that he wanted to testify, counsel refused this request for a tacti-
cal reason: Smith had a history of violent crimes that might have pre-
cluded the possibility of a manslaughter verdict if brought out on cross-
examination. 2
Persisting in his effort to testify, Smith then requested the court
to permit him to proceed as his own counsel, to appoint a new attorney,
or to allow him to testify over the objection of his attorney." The trial
judge denied the motion on the ground that Smith's right to testify had
been waived by his attorney.4 The trial court's ruling was essentially
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. People v. Smith, Criminal No. 23657 (Super. Ct., San Bernadino County, Cal.
Dec. 24, 1970).
2. Id., record at 1979.
3. Id., record at 1882-85.
4. Id., record at 1890:
Defense Counsel: "Mr. Smith wishes me to ask this question: That if he wishes
to testify and I refuse to call him, does he still have a Constitutional right to testify
in his own behalf."
The Court: "No. In my opinion, with the law being clear that the attorney has
the primary obligation and responsibility to conduct the presentation of the defense case,
he would not have a right to testify over the objection of his counsel. It would consti-
tute a waiver."
On appeal the California District Court of Appeal, in an unpublished opinion, up-
held the trial judge's ruling, holding that the trial attorney has the unilateral authority
to waive the defendant's right to tesify and that Smith was not prejudiced by the waiver.
People v. Smith, 4 Criminal No. 5740 (Feb. 21, 1974). After the California Supreme
Court denied Smith's petition for hearing, the waiver issue in his case was raised in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Although the federal magistrate's
preliminary memorandum contended that the refusal to permit Smith to testify over the
advice of his counsel was reversible error and that the harmless error rule was not ap-
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correct under present law. As a general rule defense counsel is per-
mitted to waive his client's right to testify, even though the defendant
expressly desires to take the witness stand, unless it can be shown on
appeal that the attorney's decision was incompetently made.'
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the right of a crim-
inal defendant to testify in his own behalf has become an essential ele-
ment of the due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal Constitution. This note concludes that the
right has assumed such fundamental importance that due process re-
quires that a defendant be permitted to testify even against counsel's
advice to the contrary. Essential to this analysis is a discussion of the
historical development of the right to testify, including its emergence
as a primary element of due process, an examination of the case law
concerning waiver of this important right, and an analysis of the policy
considerations affecting waiver of the right to testify.
At the outset the issue addressed here should be distinguished
from issues raised in related situations. This note does not consider
situations where a defendant decides not to testify due to fear of im-
peachment on cross-examination, 6 threatens to disrupt the proceed-
ings,? or fails to assert promptly his desire to testify against counsel's
advice." In these circumstances different considerations apply.9 This
note considers only those situations where a defendant timely asserts,
against the advice of his counsel, his desire to speak in his own behalf.
1. The Nature of the Right to Testify
Issues concerning waiver of the right to testify are largely deter-
mined by how the right to testify is characterized, since "a waiver of
a constitutional right or privilege [is] measured against a higher stand-
plicable, the federal district judge, in another unpublished opinion, denied the petition,
finding that if any error was made it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Smith v. Britt, D.C. No. 74-3123 (Cal.
Cent. Dist. Ct., Nov. 18, 1975). Smith is presently appealing this decision to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Smith v. Britt, C.A. No. 76-2228.
5. See note 83 infra.
6. See United States v. O'Day, 467 F.2d 1387, 1388 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied.
410 U.S. 912 (1973); State v. Clemmons, 460 S.W.2d 541, 545 (Mo. 1970); cf. Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
7. See Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
943 (1969). Compare United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 944 (1975), with United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916,
944 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
8. State v. Tillery, 107 Ariz. 34, 36-38, 481 P.2d 271, 273-74 (1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 847 (1971); People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 545, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346,
349 (1970); State v. Kremens, 57 NJ. 309, 311-13, 272 A.2d 537, 538-59 (1971).
9. See notes 6-8 supra.
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ard than a waiver of a right or privilege not guaranteed by the Consti-
tution."10 For this reason the historical development of the right must
be traced.
A. Common Law
Only in recent times has a criminal defendant enjoyed the oppor-
tunity to testify in his own defense. For centuries the English common
law displayed great aversion toward the testimony of all parties to an
action,1 to the extent that parties were considered incapable of being
competent witnesses. 12  In civil cases the rule of disqualification of par-
ties appears to have been well established by the end of the sixteenth
century.' 3 The primary justification for the rule was that the testimony
of any party would inevitably be biased.' 4 In the seventeenth century
the rule of disqualification was applied in civil cases to interested non-
party witnesses under this same rationale.' 5
The application of the rule of disqualification to criminal defend-
ants was a later development. In the sixteenth century the accused
was required to conduct his own defense without the assistance of ei-
ther witnesses or counsel.' 6 Consequently, the criminal trials of Eliza-
bethan England were described as "a long argument between the pris-
oner and the counsel for the Crown, in which they grappled with each
other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reason-
ing."" Through this process the defendant could offer by way of ex-
planation material that later courts would characterize as "testimony."' S
10. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 1974). A fundamental con-
stitutional right, as opposed to a mere statutory or constitutional right, is not subject
to unilateral waiver by defense counsel. See notes 85-96 and accompanying text infra.
11. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573-83 (1961); Popper, History and
Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WASH. U.L.Q. 454 (1962).
12. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 990-91 (2d ed. 1923); 1 E. COaE, ON LrrrLETON
6. b. 7. a. (1832).
13. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISroRY OF ENGLISH LAw 194 (1926).
14. See, e.g., 1 E. COKE. ON LrrrLETON 6. b. (1832): "Mn an information upon
the statute of usury, the partie to the usurious contract shall not be admitted to be a
witness against the usurer, for in effect he should be testis in propria causa, and should
avoyd his owne bonds and assurances, and discharge himselfe of the money borrowed;
and though he commonly raise up an informer to exhibit the information, yet in rei
veritate he is the partie."
15. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 990-91 (2d ed. 1923). Interested nonparty witnesses
included those who had a financial interest in the outcome of the trial, as opposed to
relatives or servants of the parties. Id. at 991-92; C. McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE 142 (2d
ed. 1972). Interested nonparty witnesses also included the victims of crimes. 1 E.
CoKE, ON LrrrLETON 6. b. (1832). See note 14 supra.
16. 1 J. STEPHEN, HIsroRy oF THE CRIMINAL LAW op ENGLAND 350 (1883).
17. Id. at 326.
18. See 1 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE 995 (2d ed. 1923).
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In the late seventeenth century Parliament enacted a statute per-
mitting a defendant who was accused of treason to call witnesses on
his behalf, 9 and by 1701 this rule was extended to a defendant accused
of any felony.20 A distinction, however, was maintained between the
defendant and his witnesses; only the latter were permitted to tes-
tify.2 The rationale for this distinction lay in the disqualification for
interest rule, which was predicated upon the traditional irrebuttable pre-
sumption that an interested party would testify only in accordance with
his own interest rather than in accordance with the truth. The criminal
defendant was, of course, an interested party, and the common law
"shuddered at the idea of any person testifying who had the least inter-
est. '" 22  As one court succinctly stated, the common law could not con-
ceive of a person who "sweareth to his own [interest] and changeth
not."'2 3 The testimony of the accused was disqualified upon the theory
that the frailty of human nature and the overpowering desire for free-
dom would ordinarily induce a person charged with a crime, if permit-
ted to testify, to swear falsely. 24  In this regard, Sir James Stephen
strenuously argued that "it is not in human nature to speak the truth
under such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner,
and it is not a light thing to institute a system which would almost en-
force perjury on every occasion. 25
19. An Act for regulating of Trials in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason,
7 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1, at 593 (1695): "[Elvery such Person so accused and indicted, ar-
raigned or tried for any such Treason, as aforesaid, or for Misprision of such Treason,
from and after the said Time, shall be received and admitted to make his and their full
Defense, by Counsel learned in the Law, and to make any Proof that he or they can pro-
duce by lawful Witness or Witnesses, who shall then be upon Oath, for his and their
just Defence in that Behalf. ... "
20. An Act for punishing of Accessories to Felonies, and Receivers of stolen
Goods, and to prevent the wilful burning and destroying of Ships, 1 Anne, St. 2, c. 9,
§ 3, at 118 (1701): "And be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, That from
and after the said twelfth Day of February one thousand seven hundred and two, all
and every Person and Persons, who shall be produced or appear as a Witness or Wit-
nesses on the Behalf of the Prisoner, upon any Trial for Treason or Felony, before he
or she be admitted to depose, or give any Manner of Evidence, shall first take an Oath
to depose the Truth, the whole Truth, and nothing but the Truth, in such Manner, as
the Witnesses for the Queen are by law obliged to do; and if convicted of any wilful
Perjury in such Evidence, shall suffer all the Punishments, Penalties, Forfeitures and
Disabilities, which by any of the Laws and Statutes of this Realm are and may be in-
flicted upon Persons convicted of wilful Perjury."
21. 1 J. WIGMORF, EViDENcE 996 (2d ed. 1923).
22. State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409 (1884).
23. State v. Wilcox, 206 N.C. 691, 693, 175 S.E. 122, 123 (1934).
24. Id.
25. J. STEPHEN, A GEN EtL Vmw OF THm CRIMNAL Lkw OF ENGLAND 202
(1863).
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This antipathy toward the testimony of criminal defendants per-
meated the English common law at the time this country was founded.
It was, therefore, only natural for the rule of disqualification to be
adopted by our own common law. In The King v. Lukens,26 one of
the first American decisions on the issue of disqualification for interest,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to accept the defendant as a
witness, holding that the issue there in question "must be proved by
indifferent witnesses. '2 7  Subsequent decisions perpetuated the policy
of prohibiting criminal defendants from testifying in their own behalf
into the nineteenth century.28
The harsh rule of disqualification for interest, however, was not
without its vigorous critics. Jeremy Bentham led a movement for evi-
dentiary reform in England, arguing for rules of evidence that would
not limit but promote the search for truth.2" The essence of this posi-
tion was that "all evidence should be taken at what it may be worth,
that no consideration which has a tendency to produce conviction in
a rational mind should be excluded from the consideration of the tri-
bunals. 30  The telling force of this argument is reflected in the num-
ber of statutes that were eventually enacted abolishing the disqualifica-
tion for interest rule.81 Through these statutes the criminal defendant
was again able to participate actively in his own defense.
B. Statutory Origins
Parties were first permitted to testify in their own behalf only in
civil actions. 2  Lord Brougham's Act of 1851 abolished the rule dis-
qualifying parties to a civil action from testifying;33 the qualification
of criminal defendants to give sworn testimony did not come until later.
In 1859 the state of Maine apparently enacted the first statute making
defendants accused of certain specified crimes competent witnesses.8 4
26. 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 5 (1762).
27. Id. at 6.
28. See, e.g., Batre v. State, 18 Ala. 119 (1850); Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89
(1864); State v. Laffer, 38 Iowa 422 (1874); State v. Bixby, 39 Iowa 465 (1874).
29. 5 J. BENTHAM, RATiONALE OF JUDIcIAL EvmEN E 34-77 (Hunt & Clarke ed.
1827).
30. T. MAcAt.TLAY, LEGisLATvE MINTES 127-28 (1835).
31. See notes 32-36 and accompanying text infra.
32. An Act for the more easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England,
9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, § 83, at 305 (1846).
33. An Act to Amend the Law of Evidence, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99, § 2, at 813
(1851).
34. Ma. PuB. LAws, ch. 104 (1859): "No respondent in a criminal prosecution
or proceeding at law, for libel, nuisance, simple assault, simple assault and battery, or
for the violation of any municipal or police ordinance, offering himself as a witness,
shall be excluded from testifying, and all laws inconsistent herewith are repealed."
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Maine then enacted a general competency statute for criminal defend-
ants in 1864, the first such statute in the English-speaking world." By
1884, only twenty years later, a majority of the states and the federal
government had followed Maine's example.3 6
The federal statute establishing the competency of a criminal de-
fendant as a witness is typical of many contemporary statutory provi-
sions:
In trial of all persons charged with the commission of offenses
against the United States... the person charged shall, at his own
request, be a competent witness. His failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against him.37
In contrast to the self-contained nature of the federal provision, the
competency statutes in some states are drafted more circuitously. In
California, for example, the penal code provides that the competency
rules for criminal trials shall be the same as those for civil trials,38 and
the California Evidence Code merely provides that parties to an action
are not excluded from being competent witnesses.3 9 Some states, such
as Arizona, have made the right to testify a constitutional as well as
statutory guarantee.40 Whatever the form of the enactment, the effect
is that the defendant enjoys the same competency to testify as all other
witnesses,
Under contemporary statutes the jury is to evaluate the testimony
of a defendant in the same manner as the testimony of other wit-
nesses.41 Although free from an irrebuttable presumption of unreliabil-
ity, a defendant's testimony, like that of any other witness, is still sub-
35. ME. PuB. LAws, ch. 280 (1864): "Sec. 1. In the trial of all indictments, com-
plaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or
offences, the person so charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed
a competent witness; the credit to be given to his testimony being left solely to the jury
under instructions of the court.
"Sec. 2. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as compelling any such per-
son to testify." See also Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
36. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 n.6 (1961). For a concise discus-
sion of the development of the accused's right to testify in Maine and England, see Pop-
per, History and Development of the Accused's Right to Testify, 1962 WAsH. U.L.Q.
454 (1962). Appendix 1 to this note contains a table of current state competency stat-
utes regarding criminal defendants as witnesses.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1970).
38. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1321 (West 1970).
39. CAL. Evm. CoDE § 700 et seq. (West 1966).
40. A_ z. CoNsT. art. 2, § 24: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right to ... testify in his own behalf .... " See also Amz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-163 (1956).
41. See, e.g., People v. Steinfeld, 38 Cal. App. 2d 280, 101 P.2d 89 (1940); Ivey
v. State, 132 Fla. 36, 180 So. 368 (1938); People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 126 N.E.2d
559 (1955); State v. Austin, 20 N.C. App. 539, 202 S.E.2d 293 (1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 285 N.C. 364, 204 S.E.2d 675 (1974).
[Vol. 3
Spring 1976) THE RIGHT TO TESTIFY
ject to vigorous cross-examination. Whether the testimony remains
credible after such cross-examination is properly a determination for
the finder of fact, since "[n]o witness including a defendant who elects
to testify in his own behalf is entitled to a false aura of veracity." 42
C. Due Process Stirrings
There is a growing recognition that the right to testify has tran-
scended its statutory origins and is now emerging as a constitutionally
protected right, inherent in the ever-broadening concept of due proc-
ess. As shown below, the constitutional dimension of the right to tes-
tify is derived from its inclusion in the rights to be heard and to be
represented by counsel. Although cases discussing the right to counsel
and the right to be heard do not directly determine who may waive
the right to testify, they do establish that the right to testify is an essen-
tial element of due process. Such a characterization of this right is an
important preliminary determination in deciding who may waive it.
1. Ferguson v. Georgia
In Ferguson v. Georgia,43 the United States Supreme Court
strongly implied that the right of a criminal defendant to testify in his
own behalf is an essential element of due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The case involved two Georgia statutes--one making a
criminal defendant incompetent to testify as a witness in his own behalf,
the other granting the trial court discretion in permitting defense coun-
sel to question a defendant who is making an unsworn statement before
the jury. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan found that Georgia
could not, consistent with due process, "deny [the defendant] the right
to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement."44  To deny
such an opportunity would deprive the accused of guidance of counsel
at the hour of trial.4"
Although the Court's holding did not expressly touch upon the
companion statute, which disqualified a criminal defendant as a sworn
witness, the narrow holding of the Court all but established as an ele-
ment of due process the right of the defendant to testify in his own
behalf. For if it is a denial of due process not to permit the defendant
to be examined directly by his attorney, then surely it is an even greater
denial of due process to refuse the defendant any opportunity to testify
42. People v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 453, 492 P.2d 1, 8, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320
(1972); cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
43. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
44. Id. at 596.
45. 365 U.S. at 594. Without such assistance "he may fail properly to introduce,
or to introduce at all, what may be a perfect defense." Id. at 595.
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in his own behalf. Similarly, in Brooks v. Tennessee4 6 the Court held
that a defendant is deprived of "the guiding hand of counsel" where
he is compelled by state procedure to testify before any other defense
witness has done so or else waive the opportunity to testify at all.47
Logically, the due process right to be examined by one's attorney and
the right to testify at the time selected by one's counsel rest upon the
assumption that there is a constitutional right to testify.
This view finds support in the concurring opinion of Justice Clark,
joined by Justice Frankfurter, in Ferguson. The two justices did not
"hesitate to state that [in their view Georgia's incompetency statute]
does not meet the requirements of due process .... -18 They noted
that when an incompetency statute comes under the Court's scrutiny
again, the "predictable" result is that it will be declared unconstitu-
tional.49 As Justice Frankfurter concluded in his separate opinion, "I
have no difficulty in moving from the Court's oblique [opinion] to the
candid determination that [the incompetency statute] is unconstitu-
tional."5 0
Given the implication of the majority opinion in Ferguson, and the
analysis contained in the concurring opinions, most courts have inter-
preted Ferguson as establishing that the right of a criminal defendant
to testify in his own behalf is an essential element of due process.51
The Supreme Court itself has cited Ferguson for this very proposition:
This Court has often recognized the constitutional stature of rights
that, though not literally expressed in the document, are essential
to due process of law in a fair adversary process. It is now ac-
cepted, for example, that an accused has a right ... to testify on
his own behalf .... 52
46. 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972).
47. Counsel must be able to assess the evidence prior to recommending whether
to put the defendant on the stand. See id. at 609-10.
48. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961) (Clark and Frankfurter, JI.,
concurring).
49. Id. at 603.
50. 365 U.S. at 601 (Clark and Frankfurter, JJ., concurring).
51. The right to testify on one's own behalf is "merely one of many rights guaran-
teed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution to insure a fair trial."
People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 545, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346, 349 (1970), citing
Ferguson v. Georgia; accord, Pigg v. State, 253 Ind. 329, 330, 253 N.E.2d 266, 267
(1969); Reagon v. State, 253 Ind. 143, 151-52, 251 N.E.2d 829, 834 (1969) (dissenting
opinion); People v. Farrar, 36 Mich. App. 294, 304-05 n.20, 193 N.W.2d 363, 369 n.20
(1972); People v. Rolston, 31 Mich. App. 200, 206, 187 N.W.2d 454, 457 (1971);
People v. Hall, 19 Mich. App. 95, 114-15 n.17, 172 N.W.2d 473, 483 n.17 (1969).
"Ferguson . . . establishes that a state law which precludes the accused in a penal cause
from testifying in his own behalf violates the constitutional guaranty of the due process of
law." People v. Hernandez, 94 P.R.R. 111, 116 (1967); cf. Fowle v. United States, 410
F.2d 48, 53 (9th Cir. 1969).
52. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 n.15 (1975).
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A few courts have read Ferguson narrowly, maintaining that the
common law rule of disqualification for interest and its statutory abro-
gation "conclusively demonstrate that the right of a criminal defendant
to testify in his own behalf is a statutory right and not a constitutional
right." 3  What these decisions fail to consider is that due process is
an ever-expanding concept.
It is of the very nature of a free society to advance in its standards
of what is deemed reasonable and right. Representing as it does a
living principle, due process is not confined within a permanent
catalogue of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the
essentials of fundamental rights. 54
As an ever-broadening concept, due process includes those procedural
safeguards that are considered to be essential to a fair judicial system.
Due process has been interpreted to include safeguards not specifically
contained in the Constitution55 or not in existence at the time of its
adoption.5 6 Hence, although the right of the accused to testify in his
own behalf was not recognized at the time of the adoption of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, this alone does not prevent its subse-
quent inclusion in the framework of essential procedural safeguards
protected by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
2. The Right to be Heard
By now the importance of the defendant's interest in testifying in
his own behalf has grown to such proportions that it must be considered
a requirement of due process regardless of which test is used to deter-
mine whether a particular right is an element of due process.
57
53. State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 554 (Mo. 1970); accord, State v. McKen-
zie, 17 Md. App. 563, 576, 303 A.2d 406, 413 (1973).
54. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
55. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process includes reasonable
doubt standard in criminal cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary
rule as part of due process).
56. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule in criminal
cases). Due process has also been extended to apply to proceedings unknown at the
time the Constitution was written. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare termination hear-
ings).
57. Such tests include whether the right (1) reflects "a fundamental principle of
liberty and justice which inheres in the very idea of free government" (Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106 (1908)); (2) "is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
(Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds in Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)); (3) is part of "those canons of decency and fair-
ness which express the notions of justice" (Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169
(1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)); or (4) is based
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Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation
of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the
social compact which defines the rights of the individual and de-
limits the powers which the state may exercise.... [Tihe procedural
rules which have been fashioned from the generality of due process
are our best instruments for the distillation and evaluation of
essential facts from the conflicting welter of data that life and our
adversary methods present. It is these instruments of due process
which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge from the
confrontation of opposing versions and conflicting data.66
The realization of these weighty goals is seriously if not totally impaired
if the accused is not afforded the opportunity to answer personally the
government's charges against him and to relate his version of the
facts."9
It has been recognized that the Constitution requires the accused
be given the "fullest opportunity to meet [and deny] the accusation
against him"' 60 and to present evidence6 ' and witnesses on his behalf. 2
In essence, "[tihe fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard."63  As a primary element of the right to be
heard, "it is basic to due process that an accused person have a fair
opportunity to tell his story in a fair trial."6' 4  Accordingly, in its broad-
est sense the right to be heard is equivalent to the basic right to pre-
sent a defense, and firmly embedded in the right to be heard is the
specific right to offer oneself as a witness in court.65
upon those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions" (Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
58. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1967).
59. The defendant's testimony is uniquely valuable. The defendant is often an
eyewitness to the crime he allegedly committed, and his testimony has special relevance
with respect to issues of his intent and state of mind at the time of the offense and af-
firmative defenses such as self-defense. Moreover, it would seem that in many cases
the defendant's primary exculpatory evidence consists in his own testimony, corroborated
by whatever detail he can muster.
60. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
61. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969).
62. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
63. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); accord, Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605, 610 (1967); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 390-91 (1898). "Where a per-
son's good name, reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the govern-
ment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). This right to be heard must be granted
"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965).
64. MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
877 (1961).
65. The defendant's "opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day
in court-[is] basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a mini-
mum, a right ... to offer testimony . . . ." In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948),
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In a trilogy of cases the Supreme Court has held that the right
to testify extends to parole and probation revocation proceedings and
to welfare termination hearings. 6 This extension of the right to testify
to proceedings tangential to the trial process must be predicated upon
the fact that the right to testify also inheres at trial.
3. The Constitutionl Basis of the Right to Testify: A Fundamental Right
There is growing conviction in the courts that the right to testify
is not merely a statutory right. By way of dictum, for example, many
courts have explicitly stated what has been implicitly assumed for some
time: that "[w]hether the defendant is to testify is . . . a matter of
constitutional right.167  In view of the above discussion, it is difficult
to imagine that a statute declaring criminal defendants to be incompe-
tent as witnesses could withstand a constitutional challenge. "Such a
restriction upon an accused's right to introduce evidence can scarcely
be squared with present-day notions of due process. It is all but impos-
sible to conceive of a trial as fair where the defendant is denied any
right to testify on his own behalf.16 8
Although the argument that the right to testify is a fundamental
component of due process appears to be compelling, there has as yet
been no definitive determination that the right is a constitutional one.
In fact, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has expressly held that
no federal question was raised by a habeas corpus petitioner who as-
serted that he was denied the right to testify on his own behalf. 6  Rec-
cited with approval in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). It is basic
to a defendant's right to be heard to be able to testify as to whether he did or did not
commit the crime for which he was charged. Moore v. Florida, 276 So. 2d 504 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1973).
66. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 269 (1973) (welfare recipient facing termination of assistance "must be
allowed to state his position orally"). Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975)
(student facing suspension from school entitled to present his case at a disciplinary hear-
ing).
67. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972); accord, United States v. Mc-
Cord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53
(9th Cir. 1969); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), affd, 352
F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Taylor v. State, 51 Ala. App. 573, 578, 287 So. 2d 889, 894
(1973), rev'd on other grounds, 291 Ala. 756, 287 So. 2d 901 (1973); People v. Stein-
field, 38 Cal. App. 2d 280, 282, 101 P.2d 89, 90 (1940); Mathis v. State, 471 S.W.2d
396, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). See note 96 infra. Cf. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 225 (1971) ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense
."); Rickey v. United States, 242 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
68. B. ScHWARiTZ, CONSTrUTONAL LAw 221 (1972); cf. Note, 3 HoFsRA L.
Rnv. 839, 842-45 (1975).
69. Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1969). In Sims the court held that
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ognition that the right to testify is guaranteed by the constitution is es-
sential because it greatly affects the determination of who may waive
that right.70 It may also affect the accused's perceptions of the fairness
of the criminal justice process.
A single indication of the fundamental importance of the right is
the grave consequences that befall a defendant who does not exercise
it."1 The position that this right occupies in the panoply of due process
safeguards has been addressed above. 72  The fundamental nature of
the defendant's right to testify is further reflected in the judicial recogni-
tion that it is a "basic constitutional safeguard, ' 7 8 "of inestimable
value.17 4 The right has been recognized "as having an importance similar
to the right to be present at one's trial and to present a defense. ' 75 Its
protection is therefore "fundamental to our judicial process," 76 giving rise
to "an obligation on the part of both the court and trial counsel to in-
form the accused of his right to testify, if he so desires.177  Conse-
quently, one court has stated that "as a matter of law, a defendant is
always vouchsafed the constitutional right to testify.178  For a trial
judge to arbitrarily deny the defendant the right to testify in his own
behalf is to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.79 Other
evidence of the fundamental nature of the defendant's right to testify
is found in cases which imply that protection of the right is more crucial
than is the right to counsel itself. The Supreme Court has held that
in welfare termination hearings, and parole and probation revocation
hearings, the right to be heard must be granted, although there is not
necessarily a right to counsel in such proceedings."'
the right to testify is purely statutory and noted that "[nlo case has been brought to
our attention to support petitioner's contention that the Fourteenth Amendment accords
a defendant in a state court a federal constitutional right to testify." Id.
70. See notes 90-106 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 111-113 and accompanying text infra.
72. See notes 44-68 and accompanying text supra.
73. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 53 (9th Cir. 1969).
74. Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1955), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
75. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir. 1963).
76. United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 1974).
77. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.D.C. 1964), ajfd, 352 F.2d
639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
78. United States v. McCord, 420 F.2d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
79. People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 457, 23 N.Y.S.2d 607, 612 (1940);
People v. Rosenzweig, 135 Misc. Rep. 324, 325, 239 N.Y.S. 358, 359 (1929); cf. United
States v. Looper, 419 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1969) (reversible error to deny defendant the
right to testify because he refuses to take religious oath).
80. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (probation revocation); Morris-
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (parole revocation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
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As indicated in the next section, if the right to testify is a funda-
mental constitutional right, it cannot be waived by counsel over his cli-
ent's objection.
11. Waiver of the Right to Testify
Courts have distinguished between the defendant's right to a day
in court and the concomitant right to have a say in that court.81 As
a result of this distinction, defense counsel has not been allowed to uni-
laterally waive the defendant's right to a jury trial,8 2 but has been al-
lowed to unilaterally waive the defendant's right to testify. Because
this waiver is viewed merely as a decision of trial tactics, appellate re-
view in the majority of jurisdictions is limited to the issue of the compe-
tency of counsel,8 3 and reversible error is seldom found.84
The minority view, as explained below, recognizes the funda-
mental importance of the right to testify and holds that it cannot be
unilaterally waived by defense counsel. This view strengthens the ac-
cused's right to testify by acknowledging it as a personal constitutional
guarantee.
A. Waiver of the Fundamental Right to Testify
A fundamental right is not subject to unilateral waiver by defense
U.S. 254, 268-70 (1970); cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (school suspen-
sion hearing).
81. In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) the Court stated that the right to
a trial and to be heard in person are "basic" due process rights.
82. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); see Brookhart v. Janis, 384
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1966). Yet the chances of obtaining a fair trial are severely restricted if
the defendant does not testify. See notes 111-113 and accompanying text infra.
83. See, e.g., Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 1969); Hayes v. Russell,
405 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1969); Hudgins v. United States, 340 F.2d 391, 396 (3rd
Cir. 1965); United States v. Garguilo, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963); Newsom v.
Smyth, 261 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1958); Palakiko v. Harper, 209 F.2d 75, 83 (9th
Cir. 1953); Casey v. Overlade, 129 F. Supp. 433, 434 (N.D. Ind. 1955); United States
v. Cameron, 84 F. Supp. 289, 290 (S.D. Miss. 1949); People v. Gutkowsky, 219 Cal.
App. 2d 223, 226-27, 33 Cal. Rptr. 79, 81-82 (1963); State v. McKenzie, 17 Md. App.
563, 582-83, 303 A.2d 406, 418-19 (1973); Commonwealth v. Claudy, 367 Pa. 130, 133,
79 A.2d 785, 786 (1951); Ex parte Lovelady, 207 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App.
1947); Washington v. Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361, 412 P.2d 449 (1966).
84. One of the few situations in which a conviction may be set aside is when de-
fense counsel keeps the defendant off the stand because of a misconception of the law.
See Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 177-79 (D.D.C. 1964), aftd, 352 F.2d 639
(D.C. Cir. 1965). 6
In California the standard for determining whether counsel was incompetent is
whether the trial was reduced to a farce or sham through the attorney's lack of compe-
tence, diligence, or knowledge of the law. People v. barra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 464, 386
P.2d 487, 490, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1963).
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counsel; s5 waiver must be made with the consent of the accused. s6 Ex-
amples of the fundamental fights of criminal defendants include the de-
cisions to plead guilty, 7 to obtain the assistance of counsel, 8 to refrain
from self-incrimination, 9 to request a jury trial, 0 and to appeal a con-
viction.91 Some courts have held that the right to testify is "such an
inherently personal fundamental right that it can be waived only by the
defendant and not by his attorney."92
In Poe v. United States,93 defense counsel induced the defendant
not to testify because counsel mistakenly believed that the prosecution
could use certain prior statements of the defendant to impeach him.
Since the prior statements were in fact inadmissible, Circuit Court
Judge J. Skelly Wright held that the free exercise of the right to testify
had been unjustifiably denied:
The right to testify is personal to the accused. He must make the
ultimate decision on whether or not to take the stand. In this
regard it is unlike other decisions, which are often called "trial
decisions," where it is counsel who decides whether to cross exam-
ine a particular witness or introduce a particular document. Here
it is the accused who must decide and it is the duty of counsel to
present to him the relevant information on which he may make an
intelligent decision.94
85. See, e.g., Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Mc-
Kenzie, 17 Md. App. 563, 584, 303 A.2d 406, 418 (1973); Grano, The Right to Coun-
sel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1175, 1213, 1216 (1970);
Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1111
(1970); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Com-
petence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CALiF. L. REv. 1262, 1267 (1966). Other con-
stitutional commentators describe the same dichotomy between rights that may be waived
by counsel unilaterally and those that may be waived only with the defendant's consent
in terms of the allocation of "decision-making responsibility." White, Federal Habeas
Corpus: The Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA.
L. REV. 67, 69 (1972).
86. See note 85 supra.
87. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966).
89. Id.
90. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930).
91. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
92. Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum).
93. 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
94. 233 F. Supp. at, 176; cf. United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63, 70 (W.D.
Pa. 1948) (holding that where counsel represents two defendants and one desires to
testify, it is the duty of the court to receive the testimony even though defense counsel
advises the defendant not to testify). But see United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639, 641
(D.C. Cir. 1965), wherein the circuit court, inaffirming the district court's opinion
in Poe, curiously stated: "Counsel has chosen to disclose his reason [for not placing
the defendant on the stand]. If he had not disclosed it, or if he had indicated that his
reason was a weakness in Poe's personality or a bad record, neither the District Court
nor this court suggests that counsel's decision could have been questioned in any proceed-
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In another case, People v. Robles,9 5 the California Supreme Court
noted that an attorney controls the course of a trial but cannot inde-
pendently waive the defendant's right to testify:
We are satisfied that the right to testify in one's own behalf is of
such fundamental importance that a defendant who timely demands
to take the stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has
the right to give an exposition of his defense before a jury ....
The defendant's insistence upon testifying may in the final analysis
be harmful to his case, but the right is of such importance that
every defendant should have it in a criminal case. Although norm-
ally the decision whether a defendant should testify is within the
competence of the trial attorney . .. where, as here, a defendant
insists that he wants to testify, he cannot be deprived of that oppor-
tunity.90
The ultimate choice of whether to waive the right to testify should
be made by the defendant with the advice of competent counsel. 7  But
to be valid a waiver must be an "intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege,"98 and it seems evident that an ac-
cused who protests counsel's decision not to put him on the stand is
not waiving that right.99 This conclusion is further supported by the
ing in any court. Counsel therefore remain free to keep defendants from testifying
whenever counsel see fit. Any suggestion to the contrary is chimerical."
95. 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 466 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1970).
96. Id.; accord, Donnelly v. State, 516 P.2d 396, 402 (Alaska 1973); Hughes v.
State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Alaska 1973); State v. Noble, 109 Ariz. 539, 541, 514
P.2d 460, 462 (1973); State v. Martin, 102 Ariz. 142, 147, 426 P.2d 639, 644 (1967);
Ingle v. State, 546 P.2d 598, 600 (Nev. 1976) (new trial granted where "appellant, hav-
ing been fully advised of the consequences, made a timely, knowing and voluntary rejec-
tion of counsel's advice, and asserted his privilege to testify . . . ." but was denied that
opportunity); People v. Guillen, 37 Cal. App. 3d 976, 984, 113 Cal. Rptr. 43, 49 (1974);
People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (1965); People v.
Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 21, 23-24, 294 N.E.2d 285, 287 (1973); cf. State v. Harper, 57 Wis.
2d 543, 550, 205 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1973) ("trial counsel cannot, without his client's express
consent. . .require his client to take the stand in his own behalf").
97. This practice has been informally established in a number of courts. See Y.
KAMIsAR, W. LEFAvE AND J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1541 (4th ed.
1974). For example, in Parsons v. United States, 404 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1968), the
court held that the defendant's right to testify had not been denied where counsel advised
the defendant not to testify, but said he was free to disregard such advice according to
his own wishes. It is also proper for the judge to advise a defendant to follow counsel's
advice not to testify, as long as the final decision is left to the defendant. United States
v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004, 1008-10 (10th Cir. 1970), vacated on other grounds sub
nom. Schreiner v. United States, 404 U.S. 67 (1971); accord, State v. Worley, 383
S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1964).
98. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938), cited with approval in Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525 (1972).
99. Authority to waive a fundamental right of the client cannot be implied from
the attorney-client relationship. Bommarito v. Southern Canning Co., 208 F.2d 56, 60-
61 (8th Cir. 1953); accord, Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 931 (9th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949) ("In absence of express authority, an attorney
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policy of indulging "every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights,"'00 particularly "those rights which
the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve
a fair trial."'' Thus, no waiver should be found where a defendant,
over his counsel's objection, timely asserts his right to testify in his own
behalf.
B. The Problem of Prejudice
The question of who may waive the right to testify should not turn
upon whether counsel's decision was competently made or whether the
defendant was actually prejudiced. Mere absence of prejudice does
not suffice to protect a fundamental right.10 2 For "there are some con-
stitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never
be treated as harmless error . . .,"10 and "[t]here is automatic reversal
of a judgment of conviction if a defendant has been denied . . .the
right to testify . ... 104 Consequently, the right should be granted
despite competent counsel's advice not to testify.'05 The right should
has no power to surrender substantial legal rights of his client."); cf. Breen v. Beto, 421
F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir. 1970); Gallegos v. Turner, 256 F. Supp. 670, 676 (D. Utah
1966), aff'd on other grounds, 386 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1045 (1968); United States v. El Rancho Adolphus Products, 140 F. Supp. 645, 649
(M.D. Pa. 1956), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Hohensee, 243 F.2d
367 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 976 (1957); In re Coggins, 13 Wash. App.
736, 537 P.2d 287, 290 (1975).
Even the defendant's continual disruption of the courtroom does not necessarily
constitute a waiver of the right to testify. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916,
944 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
100. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The question of an effective
waiver of a federal constitutional right is governed by federal standards. Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). "A choice made by counsel not participated in by
the petitioner does not automatically bar relief. Nor does a state court's finding of
waiver bar independent determination of the question by federal courts on habeas, for
waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963).
101. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237 (1973).
102. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
103. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967); cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) ("[Clonstitutional privileges ...may be conferred so ex-
plicitly as to leave no room for an inquiry whether prejudice to a defendant has been
wrought through their denial.").
104. R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 57 (1970). Where a defendant
is improperly denied the right to testify, the question whether his story is credible is
for a jury, not the court to decide. United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 944 (2d
Cir. 1963) ("Whether the jury would have believed him is immaterial; he should have
had the opportunity to present his version of the facts."); Rickey v. United States, 242
F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620,
628 (1944).
105. Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Alaska 1973).
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be granted even though it is "in the final analysis . . . harmful to [the
defendant's] case,"'1 6 or even "fatal to his chances of acquittal."' 07
If the right to testify is not regarded as a fundamental constitu-
tional right, it is still doubtful that its denial can be routinely dismissed
as harmless error. In Chapman v. California'08 the Supreme Court
found that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt."'' 10 Under that standard, the defendant's failure
to take the stand can seldom be considered harmless."10 For if he does
not testify, his silence will often prompt the jury to believe him
guilty." Indeed, the failure to exercise the right severely reduces the
possibility of a fair trial.
106. People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 466 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166,
172 (1970). The defense to the murder charge against Robles was that he was insane
and drugged at the time of the offense and that he therefore lacked the capacity to com-
mit the crime. However, the defendant was permitted to testify, over the objection of
his counsel, that he intended to and did kill the victim, that he was aware of the conse-
quences at the time of the killing, that he was not affected by any drugs at the time,
and that he was not mentally ill.
107. People v. Blye, 233 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149, 43 Cal. Rptr. 231, 236 (1965).
Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975): "The defendant, and not his law-
yer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defend-
ant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case coun-
sel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of 'that respect for the individual
which is the lifeblood of the law."' See notes 117-125 and accompanying text infra.
108. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
109. Id. at 24.
110. One of the rare situations in which a denial of the right to testify may be
harmless is where the defendant intends, in effect, to convict himself. Such an intention
should raise substantial questions as to whether the defendant is competent to stand trial.
People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 466 P.2d 710, 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1970).
Even if the defendant is allowed to testify in such a case, the bizarre nature of the de-
fendant's self-incrimination may bolster an insanity defense.
111. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 89 (2d ed. 1972). An accused who does not tes-
tify is undoubtedly prejudiced severely. Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48, 54 (9th
Cir. 1969). "The importance the jury attaches to the accused's not taking the stand
and denying his guilt cannot be overemphasized." Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp.
173, 177 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965). If the defendant does
not testify, "a prejudicial presumption is bound to arise. Jurors have brains, and con-
sciously or unconsciously, they are sure to ask themselves, If this fellow is innocent why
doesn't he get up there and say so?" Levy, Some Comments on the Trial of a Criminal
Case, 10 REc. Ass'N B.N.Y. 203, 212 (1955). "If the defendant does not testify, there
must be the most compelling of reasons. Obviously, no lawyer will assume that the pre-
sumption of innocence and the instruction upon failure to testify will satisfy the natural
feeling of the jury and of us all that an innocent man will be anxious to present his
defense in person on the stand." Robinson, The Defendant as Witness, 29 DICTA 266
(1952). "In certain cases, such as charges of receiving, and possession of stolen goods,
the facts are so peculiarly within the accused's knowledge, that failure to go into the
witness box would be a most damning circumstance in the minds of the jury." Leighton,
The Accused as a Witness, 13 CAN. B. REV. 336, 338 (1935). Consequently, "[t]here
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In 99 per cent.., of all the criminal cases tried in the eighty-six
judicial districts of the federal level [in 1956] defendants who did
not take the stand were convicted by juries . ... The fact of the
matter is that a defendant who does not take the stand does not
in reality enjoy any longer the presumption of innocence."12
In short, "[a] defendant who has been denied an opportunity to be
heard in his defense has lost something indispensable, however con-
vincing the ex parte showing ... .I"
Prejudicial as the failure to testify may be, its disastrous effect is
normally aggravated by yet another factor. In Chapman v. Califor-
nia,14 the Court held that the error complained of-improper com-
mentary by the prosecutor-was especially harmful because the de-
fendants had not taken the stand to refute the allegations against
them."15 When the prosecutor's evidence is combined with the equally
fatal inferences that are drawn against a defendant who does not per-
sonally protest his innocence it is virtually certain that a guilty verdict
will result."'
M. Policy Considerations Affecting Waiver of the
Right to Testify
Aside from the legal argument that the right of a defendant to
testify in his own behalf is a fundamental right and therefore cannot
be waived by counsel without the defendant's consent, several policy
considerations that compel the same conclusion should be acknowl-
edged. Our conception of fairness to the individual requires that a
criminal defendant be permitted to have his say in a court of law. As
a practical matter, moreover, the general practice among expert crim-
inal attorneys is to permit the defendant to testify even against their
advice to the contrary.
is a clear consensus among prosecutors and defense attorneys that the likelihood of con-
viction is increased enormously when the defendant does not take the stand." Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Ques-
tions, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1966); accord, Note, To Take the Stand or Not
to Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUm.
J.L. & Soc. PnoB. 215, 221-22 (1968).
112. Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 42 (1957). "The
number of defendants who fail to testify and who are yet acquitted must be almost neg-
ligible." United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 579 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting
opinion, quoting C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 280 (1954 ed.).
113. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934).
114. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
115. Id. at 25-26.
116. Denial of the right to testify is thus most prejudicial when evidence of guilt
is most weighty. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 177 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd,
352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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A. Considerations of Human Dignity
The underlying rationale for permitting the accused to make the
final decision as to fundamental matters of trial strategy is respect for
the individual and his right to make those decisions that critically affect
his life and liberty. 117  Certainly if a defendant accepts the services of
an attorney the latter must be free to make technical judgments requir-
ing expert skills and experience. But accepting services from an attor-
ney should not require the defendant to forfeit all control over his de-
fense. It is the defendant who suffers the consequences of a convic-
tion. Our legal system requires that crucial decisions be made by the
individual, if competent, not for him by somebody else." 8  "[W]hat-
ever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there
can be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free
choice.""' 9
In Faretta v. California20 the Supreme Court held that a defend-
ant has a constitutional right to defend himself so long as the decision
is knowingly and intelligently made. "The right to defend is given di-
rectly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the
defense fails."'' Thus,
[a]n accused has a fundamental right to confront his accusers and
... to present himself and his position to the jury not merely as a
witness ...but as a man on trial who elects to plead his own
cause .... A defendant has the moral right to stand alone in his
hour of trial .... Even if the defendant will likely lose the case
anyway, he has the right-as he suffers whatever consequences
there may be-to the knowledge that it was the claim that he put
forward that was considered and rejected, and to the knowledge
that in our free society, devoted to the ideal of individual worth,
he was not deprived of his free will to make his own choice, in his
hour of trial .... 122
If the right to testify in one's own behalf is to have any meaning, it
cannot be taken away from a defendant who feels the human instinct
to meet the accusations against him despite counsel's advice that unfor-
tunate consequences may result. A defendant should be recognized
as having a basic right to plead his case before his peers, and neither
117. Respect for the individual is "the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
118. An analogy is found in medicine where the patient must be permitted to make
the fundamental decisions as to what the doctor does with him. Compare ABA PROJ.
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION 234 (1970) with L. ELDREDGE TRIALS OF A PHILADELPHIA LAWYER 221
(1968).
119. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833-34 (1975).
120. Id. at 834-36.
121. 422 U.S. at 819-20.
122. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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the court nor defense counsel should be permitted to deprive a defend-
ant of that right to exercise his free will. 2 '
Additionally, if the defendant is denied the opportunity to testify
and is convicted, extreme resentment of the legal system is likely to
result. To force a lawyer's advice upon a client "can only lead him
to believe that the law contrives against him."' 24  On the other hand,
a "broad policy objective of the constitutional guarantee of an oppor-
tunity to testify . .. is to enhance the chance of rehabilitating [pris-
oners] by treating them with 'basic fairness.' "125
B. Practical Considerations
Theoretical concepts have little value if they are not workable in
practice. But the soundness of requiring the defendant's personal
waiver of his right to testify in his own behalf is evidenced by its ac-
ceptance in practice. The general belief of expert criminal attorneys
is that the defendant's right to testify should be waived only with the
defendant's consent.126
There are, of course, tactical reasons why it may be best for the
defendant not to testify. This may be true, for instance, if the prose-
cutor's cross-examination of the defendant could supply missing ele-
ments of proof, or reveal prior convictions or the defendant's abrasive
personality.' 27 Other reasons include the possibility that the prosecutor
will present a prior inconsistent statement by the defendant for im-
123. Cf. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279-80 (1942):
"The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's
help are not legal formalisms. They rest on considerations that go to the substance of
an accused's position before the law. The public conscience must be satisfied that fair-
ness dominates the administration of justice. An accused must have the means of pre-
senting his best defense .... When the administration of the criminal law . . . is
hedged about as it is by the Constitutional safeguards for the protection of an accused,
to deny him in the exercise of his free choice the right to dispense with some of these
safeguards [such as the advice of counsel], and to base such denial on an arbitrary rule
that a man cannot choose to conduct his defense . . .unless, against his will, he has
a lawyer to advise him, although he reasonably deems himself the best advisor for his
own needs, is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution."
124. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
125. People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 874, 533 P.2d 1024, 1031, 120 Cal. Rptr.
384, 391 (1975) (discussing parole revocation hearings); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 484 (1972).
126. See A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES §
391, 1-389 (2d ed. 1971); Levy, Some Comments on the Trial of a Criminal Case, 10
REc. Ass'N B.N.Y. 203, 213 (1955); Robinson, The Defendant as a ,Witness, 29 DICTA
266 (1952); Steinberg, A Conversation With Defense Counsel on Problems of a Crim-
inal Defense, 7 PRAc. LAw. 25, 37 (May 1961); cf. Bress, Professional Ethics in Crim-
inal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's Responsibility, 64 Mica. L. REV. 1493, 1496
(1966); Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. Rnv. 1469, 1477 (1966).
127. Robinson, The Defendant as a Witness, 29 DICrA 266 (1952).
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peachment purposes or illegally obtained evidence for purposes of re-
buttal.1 28
Counsel should weigh these considerations and decide in the first
instance whether or not he thinks the defendant ought to testify.
That decision should be told to the defendant, with the reasons for
it. Counsel may properly urge the defendant that it is unwise or
dangerous for him to take the stand. However, if a defendant
wishes to testify despite advice to the contrary, it is necessary to
yield to his stubbornness .... Counsel should always clearly outline
to the defendant the hazards of his testifying (whether or not coun-
sel wants to put him on). But if this fails to daunt the client, and
if counsel's advice against testifying fails to persuade him, the client
should be allowed to testify.' 29
The fact that the client may not appear to counsel as a person of im-
pressive personality or as a good witness does not alter the fact that
it is the defendant's day in court, and it is he who faces the possibil-
ity of incarceration or fines. "It seems reasonable to believe that if
he is convicted [after being swept off the stand by his own attorney] there
will be many nights and days in the penitentiary when he will wonder
why he did not testify."' 30
C. Ethical Considerations
Recognition of the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf
raises an important ethical question that must be addressed. Should
the defendant be permitted to testify over counsel's advice even when
counsel knows that the defendant intends to commit perjury?
The existence of this ethical problem should not entitle defense
counsel unilaterally to silence the defendant. The traditional approach
to this problem is that "[i]f, before trial, the defendant insists that he
will take the stand to testify falsely, the lawyer must withdraw from
the case .. . .""I3 If the motion for leave to withdraw is denied,
counsel must proceed with the case.
128. A. AMSTERDAM, TmAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 390,
1-390 (2d ed. 1971).
129. Id. at § 391, 1-390; accord, ABA PRoJ. ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2, 237-38 (1970): "(a)
Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and
others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the
accused after full consultation with counsel are . . . (iii) whether to testify in his own
behalf." The following courts have specifically endorsed this ABA standard: Poteat v.
United States, 330 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C. App. 1974); People v. Valentino, 356 N.Y.S.2d
962, 967 (Super. Ct., Nassau County, N.Y. 1974); Taylor v. State, 291 Ala. 756, 763,
287 So. 2d 901, 906 (1973); People v. Brown, 54 Il1. 2d 21, 23-24, 294 N.E.2d 285, 287
(1973); Morse v. People, 180 Col. 49, 55, 501 P.2d 1328, 1331 (1972).
130. Robinson, The Defendant as a Witness, 29 DICTA 266, 267 (1952).
131. ABA PROJ. ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNC-
'TON AND THE DEFENSE FUNCtON § 7.7(b), 167 (1970).
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If the defendant persists in his decision to perjure himself, then the
lawyer must, unfortunately, permit him to testify. In this event,
however, counsel will have fulfilled his moral obligations to the
court and will have maintained his client's ...respect.' 32
An alternative approach to this problem is proposed by Professor
Monroe Freedman. He argues that "the attorney who prevents his cli-
ent from testifying only because the client has confided his guilt to him
is violating that confidence by acting upon the information in a way
that will seriously prejudice his client's interest."'13 3 This is especially
true when considered in light of the extreme prejudice that a defendant
suffers when he does not take the stand. 34 An attorney's withdrawal
from the case will only require the client to obtain another attorney.
Because the defendant will realize that the confidential privilege is not
inviolate, he will simply withhold incriminating information or the fact
of his guilt from his new attorney.' 35 Asking for leave to withdraw
on ethical grounds, Freedman continues, is likely to indicate to the trial
judge, who will also be the sentencing judge, that the defendant is
guilty and is going to attempt to perjure himself.' 6 Consequently,
Freedman concludes:
[T]he obligation of confidentiality, in the context of our adversary
system, apparently allows the attorney no alternative to putting
a perjurious witness on the stand without explicit or implicit dis-
closure of the attorney's knowledge to either the judge or the
jury.' 37
Without favoring either of these competing solutions to the ethical
problem posed by the defendant who insists upon committing perjury,
it should be emphasized that neither solution would permit the attorney
simply to keep the defendant off the stand. Implicit in either approach
is the realization that the right to testify lies beyond those tactical deci-
sions which can be made by the lawyer alone. Even where the attor-
ney has the most compelling ethical reasons for not putting the defend-
ant on the stand, it is not the lawyer's prerogative to waive the defend-
132. Bress, Professional Ethics in Criminal Trials: A View of Defense Counsel's
Responsibility, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 1493; 1496 (1966).
133. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1475 (1966).
134. See notes 111-113 and accompanying text supra.
135. See note 133, supra.
136. Id. at 1476.
137. Id. at 1477-78. "Of course, before the client testifies perjuriously, the lawyer
has a duty to attempt to dissuade him on grounds of both law and morality. In addi-
tion, the client should be impressed with the fact that his [untruthfulness] is tactically
dangerous. There is always a strong possibility that the prosecutor will expose the per-
jury on cross-examination. However. . .the final decision must necessarily be the cli-
ent's. The lawyer's best course thereafter would be to avoid any further professional
relationship with a client whom he knew to have perjured himself." Id. at 1478.
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ant's right to testify unilaterally. Either counsel must withdraw from
the case, or the defendant's desire to commit perjury must be heeded.
Counsel should be permitted to withdraw from the case because
of a disagreement as to whether the defendant should testify only when
the defendant intends to commit perjury, if indeed withdrawal is ever
appropriate in such circumstances. If the defendant does not intend
to commit perjury, counsel should simply let the defendant take the
stand if that is the informed defendant's desire.,"'
The fact that an indigent defendant and his appointed counsel
disagree as to whether the former should testify does not necessarily
mean that the attorney should be discharged although it is a
factor to be considered in connection with a motion for substitu-
tion. Requiring an attorney against his better judgment to exam-
ine his client places no unfair burden on the attorney: an attorney
is always faced with the burden of developing his trial strategy
in the light of what evidence is available and presented in court.
Nor is a defendant ordinarily prejudiced when he is represented by
an attorney who believes, contrary to the defendant, that the latter
should not testify."30
Conclusion
For centuries the criminal defendant was prevented from testify-
ing in his own behalf by an inflexible rule of disqualification for inter-
est. In recent times this harsh rule has been abrogated by statute in
every state and by the federal government. More importantly, there
is a growing consciousness among the courts that the right to testify-
the cornerstone in the elementary right to be heard-is a fundamental
due process right. As such, the right to testify should be recognized
as a personal right of the defendant, and the defendant should be able
to exercise that right even against his own counsel's advice. Otherwise,
our legal system would countenance the injustice so pervasive during
the centuries of the old disqualification for interest rule-that of send-
ing men and women to prison and death without giving them an oppor-
tunity to protest their innocence or to present mitigating circumstances.
Defendants, like their counsel, may make the wrong choice in deciding
whether to exercise the right to testify, but even then it is better that
the accused know that it was his word and appearance that was consid-
138. See notes 126-129 and accompanying text supra.
139. People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 215, 466 P.2d 710, 716-17, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166,
172-73 (1970). Consequently, there appears to be little foundation for a competing pol-
icy argument that defense counsel would be intolerably burdened by being forced to put
the defendant on the stand. See notes 126-129 and accompanying text supra. Similarly,
the argument that only an attorney can make the proper tactical decision as to whether
the defendant should testify is outweighed by the fact that the right to testify is a per-
sonal, fundamental constitutional right. See notes 85-107 and accompanying text supra.
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ered and that his conviction was not due to his counsel's refusal to let
him speak out on his own behalf.
For this reason alone, issues regarding waiver of the right to testify
should not turn upon the question of whether the defendant was preju-
diced by not being allowed to take the stand. The law recognizes that
many other constitutional rights of the criminal defendant are so basic
to our sense of human dignity that their denial cannot be condoned
under the stamp of harmless error. Furthermore, on a practical level
the defendant who does not testify is prejudiced. The jury naturally
expects to hear the defendant's story and is quick to infer guilt when
the accused remains silent in the face of the accusations against him.
So great is this prejudice that defendants who do not testify effectively
lose the presumption of innocence, something that is surely beyond the
province of the lawyer to waive unilaterally.
Defense counsel should be compelled to place his client on the
stand if, even after having understood the reasons for not testifying,
the client insists upon taking the stand. Due process is a hollow protec-
tion if it does not mean the right to answer personally the charge
brought against one in a court of law. Counsel has no more right to
waive unilaterally one's right to due process of law than to argue the
guilt of his client.
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Appendix
Current State Statutes Making Criminal Defendants Competent Witnesses
ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 305 (1959).
ALASKA RULES OF CT., Crv. R. 43(g); ALASKA CUM. R. 26(a) (1963).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-163 (1956).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2016 (1964).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1321 (West 1970); CAL. EvD. CODE § 700 et seq.
(West 1966). See also CAL. CONST. art. I § 13.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-101 (1973).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3501 (1974).
FLA. R. CR. PRO. 3.250 (1973).
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1603 (1974).
HAWAn REV. STAT. § 621-15 (1968).
IDAHO CODE §§ 9-201, 19-3001 (1948).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1 (1973).
IND. CODE § 35-1-31-3 (1975).
IOWA CODE § 781.12 (1950). See also IowA CODE § 781.13 (1950).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3415 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-407 (1964);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (1964).
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.225 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
LA. REv. STAT. § 15:461 (1967). See also LA. REv. STAT. § 15:462 (1967).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Mn. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 9-107 (1974).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2159 (1968).
MINN. STAT. § 611.11 (1964). See also MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (Cum. Supp.
1976).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-9 (1972).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.260 (1949). See also Mo. REv. STAT. § 546.270
(1949).
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-3010 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. §§ 93-701-1 to-3 (1947).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2011 (1964).
NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.221 (1967). See also NEv. REv. STAT. § 50.015 et
seq. (1971).
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:31 (1974). See also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 516:32 (1974).
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-8 (1976).
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 60.15 (McKinney 1971).
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N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-21-11 (1974).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.43 (1975).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 701 (1969).
ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.643 (1975).
PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 681 (1964). See also PA. STAT. tit. 19, § 631 (1964).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-17-9 (1969).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-405 (1962).
S.D. CODE § 19-1-1 (1967).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2403 (1955). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2404
(1955).
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 38.08 (1966).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-44-5, 77-44-1, 78-24-1, etseq. (1953).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6601 (1974).
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268 (1975).
WASH. REv. CODE § 10.52.040 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-6 (1966).
WIs. STAT. § 325.13 (1958).
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-244 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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